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**Operational Leadership and United States
Army Leadership Doctrine:
Forging The Future Today.**

**A Monograph
by
Major Mark T. Littel
Armor**



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**School of Advanced Military Studies
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ABSTRACT

Operational Leadership and United States Army Leadership Doctrine: Forging the Future Today, by MAJ Mark T. Littel, USA, 54 pages.

This monograph analyzes the 1944-45 Burma Campaign between the Japanese and Allied forces as a case study to evaluate current United States Army Senior Leadership doctrine in Field Manual 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels. It uses this case study to evaluate the utility of current senior leadership models and concepts as they apply to expected coalition warfare in the future.

The monograph first reviews doctrine that is in Field Manual 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels and summarizes key leadership concepts and requirements. Second, it summarizes the Burma Campaign and how General William Slim developed, planned, and executed his campaign in the Burma Theater of Operations. Finally, it analyzes the key leadership concepts and requirements in FM 22-103 and provides additional concepts that proved to be of use to Slim during the Burma Campaign and that should be useful in coalition campaigns of the future.

The monograph concludes that the Burma Campaign provides some very cogent concepts for coalition warfare and operational leadership doctrine within that environment. While the key imperatives in our current doctrine are useful, there are additional concepts that demand inclusion into any future revisions of current United States Army senior leadership doctrine. Slim recognized these concepts as part of his road map to victory; operational commanders of tomorrow would be well served by keeping these same concepts in their intellectual kit-bag for the next war.

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I-INTRODUCTION

History is replete with instances of leadership in combat, and volumes of text exist that illustrate those examples. Sun Tzu, an ancient military theorist and general in the Chinese Army of 400 B.C., discussed the effects of leadership on the battlefield and asserted that the leadership of generals creates the situations which result in victory for a nation.¹ In more recent times, Karl Von Clausewitz made a further distinction between leadership and generalship. In his work on warfare titled On War, Clausewitz wrote extensively of leadership on the field of battle and the ability of a senior army general to conceptualize, think, and reason his way through the uncertainty of the battlefield. Clausewitz contended that to break through the uncertainty of war, "powers of the intellect"² provide a vehicle for victory. This leadership/generalship requirement remains a prerequisite for the operational commander of today and tomorrow and is the primary focus of this monograph.

Current U. S. warfighting doctrine requires that large joint and combined force commanders provide purpose, direction, and motivation to their forces.³ This doctrine must further provide subordinate commanders with a focus, vision, and anticipation of future events in the course of a campaign.⁴ By providing subordinate commanders with these key leadership attributes, the operational commander must match ways, means, and ends to achieve both his operational and strategic

objectives in a theater of war. That is no easy task, and on the battlefield of tomorrow operational commanders will have their leadership skills tested across the entire spectrum of warfare. This operational leadership test may occur in operations short of war, such as the current operation in Somalia, or on the complex battlefield of what used to be known as Yugoslavia. In all cases, how well operational commanders are prepared to assume leadership in such diverse arenas may provide the margin of victory at the operational level of war.

Current senior leadership doctrine for the U.S. Army is in Field Manual 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels and addresses the expected leadership qualities and attributes of senior leaders in the Army. This monograph studies whether that doctrine addresses all the key leadership qualities and attributes that the operational commander requires in order to design and execute operational campaigns in the pursuit of operational and strategic objectives. The answer to this question is of vital importance, as senior leadership doctrine of the United States Army must completely address the leadership requirements of the operational commander. This senior leadership doctrine is the foundation for leadership by our nation's senior Army warfighters, and incomplete leadership doctrine at the strategic and operational level may very well lead to defeat in battle in spite of tactical victory. As the United States military transitions to a force projection capability, these leadership qualities will continue to be essential attributes for operational commanders in the future.

The study begins with a detailed examination of the United States Army's senior leadership doctrine contained in Field Manual 100-23, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels (FM 22-103). As this manual is the cornerstone of senior leadership, this examination will include how this leadership doctrine applies to the operational commander of today and tomorrow. A historical case study follows, highlighting the campaign of the Fourteenth Army commanded by British Field Marshal Viscount William Slim. This campaign, a supporting effort in a secondary theater of operations, provides a clear example of inspirational operational leadership that resulted in turning, in Slim's words, "defeat into victory."⁵ Slim's actions, decisions, and most importantly, his very successful operational leadership qualities, provide a baseline in history for an analysis of operational leadership requirements in combat. Analysis of United States Army senior leadership doctrine in FM 22-103 will compare what Slim used successfully in combat with what we hold to be true in our current doctrine. The criteria for analysis are: vision, purpose, direction, and motivation. These are the cornerstones espoused in FM 22-103. Conclusions to this study will ascertain whether current United States Army senior leadership doctrine is adequate and properly addresses those key attributes required of operational commanders in combat.

II-SENIOR LEADERSHIP DOCTRINE

United States Army senior leadership doctrine today identifies senior leadership as an essential ingredient for victory in war. FM 22-103 defines leadership as the "art of direct and indirect influence and the skill of creating the conditions for sustained organizational success to achieve the desired result." ⁶ The essential senior leadership attributes outlined in FM 22-103 require that the senior commander first provide his organization with a clear vision for the future. Vision is the "hub or core from which flows the leadership and command force that fires imaginations, sustaining the will to win." ⁷ Second, the senior leader must provide purpose to the organization; that purpose communicates the "why" for an organization.⁸ Third, he must provide direction to his organization and maintain a focus on mission from the top down.⁹ Lastly, the senior leader must provide motivation to his organization to develop a winning and cohesive team.¹⁰ A closer examination of these key attributes is necessary to provide a more comprehensive understanding of current senior leadership doctrine in the United States Army.

Vision is an essential attribute for the senior leader today. Current doctrine graphically describes vision as the center of a wheel hub, with the myriad of characteristics (ethics, professional skills, organizational skills, etc.) making up the spokes that support the outer portion of the wheel. Vision, then, is the hub of all that the senior leader is and provides his organization with his concept of where the organization is going in the future.¹¹ In the development of a campaign, the

commander's vision provides a clear concept of how the commander visualizes the campaign unfolding over time and space. This vision creates the critical focus and emphasis that keeps an organization continuously oriented on the senior commander's ultimate objectives.

The requirement to have a purpose for an organization is fundamental in U.S. military history. Baron Von Steuben learned that American soldiers performed best when they understood why they were doing some particular activity.¹² Today this is still very much the case. Senior commanders must establish the purpose, the why for their organization, in order to provide focus on organizational missions. In a larger sense, this purpose provides subordinate formations with the aim of the mission, a shared understanding of what is necessary, and the ability to operate as a more cohesive unit.¹³ Subordinates can better understand the operational commander's intent by understanding the commander's vision

Senior commanders develop a clear course to follow by providing direction throughout their organization. They accomplish this by assigning missions and tasks to subordinates that support the senior commander's vision, by setting and maintaining standards in training for war, and by enforcing standards in training, discipline, and policies.¹⁴ Senior leaders, when effectively combining purpose with direction, provide subordinates with a more complete understanding of their vision. The synergistic effect of this focus is part of the combat power provided by effective leadership in war.

As organizations move and fight, senior commanders must motivate individuals and organizations subordinate to them. Senior leaders are keepers of "the moral force,"¹⁵ and must impel or incite subordinates to accomplish tasks or missions, especially in combat. Leaders do this in several ways by: training to standard both technically and tactically, providing a proper ethical climate, fostering a sense of unity and team, and establishing an effective command climate.¹⁶ In so doing, senior commanders provide the moral force to an organization. This motivation, essential to an organization, provides the last ingredient for the senior level commander to use in completing his leadership responsibilities as a senior leader.

The senior commander must provide his subordinates with a clear vision, with a purpose and direction that are inextricably linked with that vision. Motivation of both individuals and organizations is the final essential ingredient in this leadership mixture. Although these essential ingredients are not all of the requirements for the senior leader, they are the essential ingredients that create the framework for a functioning organization. The Burma Campaign and General William Slim provide the case study against which these attributes will later be compared. First, it is necessary to examine the Burma Campaign and the man who led the formations that served there, General Bill Slim.

III-The Burma Campaign and General Bill Slim

The Burma campaign, planned and executed by the Fourteenth Army, is a superb example of an operational leader in action. General Bill Slim commanded the forces that successfully defeated the Japanese in Burma in 1944. This section of the monograph takes a historical look at the war in Burma and eastern India and focuses on Slim's leadership in combat. The historical background is the baseline for analysis of senior leadership doctrine in Section IV . Before a detailed discussion on the campaign itself begins, it is necessary to place the campaign within the perspective of the entire Southeast Asian theater of war.

The time was 1943, and the Japanese, defending in the Pacific, continued an offensive campaign into Burma that had started with an attack on Honk Kong on December 8, 1941. The objective of this offensive was initially the occupation of Malaysia and control of the raw materials within the country.¹⁷ The Japanese continued to attack, with General Yamashita's Twenty-fifth Army conducting amphibious landings in Malaysia. British forces on the island were poorly trained in jungle warfare compared to the Japanese. In fact, the British army was still focused on desert battles rather than on ancillary and inconsequential jungle battles. Thus far in the war, British focus had been on fighting in the Middle East and consequently, on desert warfare. The invading Japanese forces soundly defeated the demoralized , poorly trained, and ill-equipped British forces. The island surrendered

on 15 February 1942. The Japanese foothold on southeast Asia continued to spread to the west in search of power.¹⁸

In January 1942, the Japanese simultaneously attacked into Burma, with Fifteenth Japanese Army objectives oriented on seizing airfields and the major ports of Burma.¹⁹ The Japanese army was commanded by General Mataguchi. The Japanese faced an untrained and undisciplined British force commanded by LTG Hutton. These British troops, just like their countrymen in Malaysia, lacked the equipment and jungle training to make any type of credible stand against the battle hardened, jungle-smart Japanese. At the Sittang bridge east of Rangoon, two British brigades (of the two divisions facing the Japanese) were accidentally cut off when the bridge, which was to the rear of the two brigades, prematurely blew up. The capture of these two brigades, a glaring tactical error by British leadership, clearly illustrated that the British forces were untrained in jungle warfare. The subsequent withdrawal of the Burma forces north of Rangoon in March 1942 continued to spell disaster for the British in spite of superb air support.²⁰ The remaining British forces stumbled their way northward fighting rearguard actions, losing a majority of their equipment enroute to India. The soldiers were saved by timely air support during this retreat. This air support would later play a key role in the Burma campaign.

General Bill Slim assumed command of the Burma Corps (BURCORPS) in late March 1942, the change in leadership an attempt to stop the hemorrhaging of the Burma Theater. Japanese forces continued to push

north of Rangoon, facing from west to east the Burma Corps, the Chinese Fifth Army and the Chinese Sixth Army (both Chinese forces under the command of American General "Vinegar Joe" Stillwell). With this combined force in place, the Japanese were still successful in pushing the poorly trained and equipped BURCORPS continuously to the north of Rangoon. The BURCORPS forces could not counter the successful Japanese infiltration/encirclement tactics, in spite of the best efforts of Slim and his subordinate commanders. On 10 April, BURCORPS forces conducted a rearguard action, blowing up oil fields in and around Mandalay and prevented Japanese forces from later using them for support..²¹

The eastern flank of the Burma Theater began to collapse, culminating in the capture of Lashio. Slim had no choice but to order the retreat of his defeated forces across the Chindwin River at Kalewa. Only 12,000 of the original 36,000 BURCORPS soldiers successfully crossed the Chindwin River. The Japanese either captured or killed those that remained. The Chinese forces to the east suffered a similar defeat. The Chinese 38th Division, cut off from the rest of the Chinese forces, turned west into eastern India to escape the Japanese onslaught and crossed the Chindwin River north of the BURCORPS. Stillwell put the defeat into perspective by stating: " we got a hell of a beating. We got run out of Burma and it is humiliating. We ought to go find out why it happened, go back and retake it." ²²

General Slim, suffering from defeat as well, had the same thoughts in mind as he began to rebuild his forces in India. The final location of forces placed what was

left of the Burma Corps in Eastern India, with its northern flank secured by the 38th and 39th Chinese Divisions, commanded by General Stillwell.

Cautious attacks by British forces in the subsequent First Arakan Offensive, meant to gain confidence and tactical experience in jungle warfare, were counterattacked by aggressive Fifteenth Japanese Army forces. The forces in India needed time to regroup, retrain, and recover from defeat. In subsequent operations, they would prove that this was time well spent.

The Fourteenth Army was, in mid 1943, at a crossroads. The monsoon season was making any operations virtually impossible for both the Japanese and the British. General Slim was appointed as the commander of the Fourteenth Army in October of 1943. Lord Mountbatten, the commander of the Southeast Area Command, trusted Slim and felt that he could take action to improve the situation in the Burma area of operations.²³ Slim, for his part as the commander, envisioned two critical issues that he had to resolve. First, he had to design and execute a plan that would ensure victory over the Japanese. Second, as the commander of a beaten army thus far, he had to improve the training, morale,²⁴ and capabilities of the Fourteenth Army. Slim believed, much like our current doctrine states, that the will of the commander, and the will to fight and win by subordinates, were inextricably linked to his desire for victory.²⁵

Slim developed a mental image of his campaign that would change the defeat of his forces in Burma to an ultimate victory. His mental image, today referred to as an operational concept, focused on overextending the Japanese by enticing

them to attack into India in the area of Imphal/Kohima. He envisioned that the Japanese offensive, stretched out over an extended line of communication through Burma, coupled with the monsoon (lack of any trafficability) and a lack of Japanese airpower, would culminate in the area of Imphal.²⁶ Slim intended to transform the Imphal plain into a killing ground, around which he would build a credible defense whose immediate end was to hit the Japanese in a stroke that would allow the Fourteenth Army to transition to the offense to destroy the Japanese. He explained his concept:

"If we could somehow seriously weaken the Japanese before we plunged into Burma, the whole picture would be changed. The only way this could be done was, at an early stage, to entice the enemy into a major battle in circumstances so favorable to us that we could smash three to four of his divisions. The thought of how to do this constantly nagged at my mind."²⁸

Slim met his first imperative. He decided that he would assume a tactical defense around the area of Imphal, within the framework of a strategic offense. The Japanese soon became willing accomplices to the plan. Slim had, in the words of Sun Tzu, begun to set the conditions for victory.

With Slim's operational concept formed, he began to shift his immediate efforts to his subordinates. He had many of his forces training in India in preparation for future operations. Small unit patrolling restored confidence in soldiers and leaders in the Army. Tough realistic training, just as it has its positive influence in the U.S. Army today, paved the way to victory.²⁹ Slim's postulation was accurate. The Fourteenth Army had become, as a result of improved equipment, more conscientious leadership, and superb training, a skillful and confident force.

The defeated forces of the BURCORPS had become a force to be reckoned with.³⁰ Slim orchestrated small, carefully chosen attacks against Japanese detachments that were always successful. At the same time, Slim directed units off of front lines to attend jungle training camps set up in eastern India. The training and patrolling efforts had the desired effect of greatly improved readiness and confidence of soldiers under Slim's command. His intent was to create a feeling of superiority in his formations that would prepare them for successful large operations. In the Arakan, the XVth Corps, commanded by General Christianson, defeated a Japanese offensive for the first time. The Battle of Arakan had handed the not-so-invincible Japanese their first real defeat and greatly improved the morale of soldiers throughout the theater.³¹ Slim's assessed these attacks as a complete success.³² He had forged the weapon that would execute his operational concept. The Fourteenth Army was ready again for battle.

The victory in the Arakan was the turning point in the war as the Japanese became even more convinced that Slim had committed the last of his reserves to the Arakan. They also believed that there was no way of reinforcing British forces around Imphal, and that the Japanese had the opportunity and strength to defeat the forces in Assam. (This included capture of the airfields and LOC's of the British and the severing of Chinese lines of communications once and for all).³³ The Japanese had fallen into the trap set by Slim's operational concept developed the previous October. They were going to attack into the teeth of a prepared British defense at Imphal and Kohima.

The Japanese offensive towards Imphal began on 7 March 1944, the operation titled U-Go by the Japanese leadership. Mutaguchi's Fifteenth Japanese Army pressed westward into India to destroy the British forces in the Assam region, to cut off lines of supply to the Chinese along the Lido road and to capture the airfields in western India that Allied forces used as supply conduits to Chinese forces in China.³⁴ The Japanese attacked along three major axis. The 33rd Japanese Division focused on enveloping British forces to the south and west of Imphal. They attacked in the south and initially enveloped British positions. The understrength 15th Japanese Division focused in the center at Imphal and conducted a direct attack on forces just east of Imphal. The 31st Japanese Division focused on the high ground of Kohima and attacked Allied forces in Kohima. All three divisions met with stiff resistance as the anvil that Slim had forged, the Fourteenth Army, began to punish the Japanese for their error in attacking into Imphal.

Slim had positioned his forces with the IV Corps, under command of General Scoones, focused on Imphal. The IV Corps had two divisions east and south of Imphal. The 17th Division under the command of MG Cowan, faced off against the 33rd Japanese Division. The 20th Indian Division, under the command of MG Gracey, defended east of Imphal and took the brunt of the attack of the 15th Japanese Division. In the north, around Kohima there were only territorial forces and support units to defend against the unexpected 31st Japanese Division thrust there. Here, Slim had miscalculated and had emplaced only minimum forces in Kohima.³⁵ His reason was that he expected only a regiment or less to attack the Kohima

entrenchments. The battles for Imphal and Kohima would last for over two months and the strength of the will of the soldier, as well as the strength of Slim's will, paved the way to victory.³⁶

In the southern sector of the Imphal battle, Japanese forces used successful encirclement techniques to isolate and surround the 17th Indian Division. The division initially occupied positions from Kennedy Peak to Tiddum. The Japanese 33rd Division struck with full strength on 13 March 1944, two days prior to the date anticipated by Schoones and Slim.³⁷ Cowen's division fought valiantly through roadblock after roadblock. Cowen's forces defeated Japanese detachments along their route of egress towards Imphal.³⁸ The Army reserve contained the 23rd Division, held from offensive action in accordance with Slim's plan³⁹ with one brigade dispatched to the south of Imphal to assist in clearing the Japanese from the road to Imphal. The Army reserve had lost almost one-third of its combat power by this deployment south, but the brigade that deployed to help Cowan performed superbly.⁴⁰ British forces in the division used their own brand of encirclement to push through the Japanese roadblocks, and some 2,300 vehicles and 3,500 animals of all sizes reached blocking positions just south of Imphal on 5 April. The division set reconnaissance in the area of Bishenpur and held off countless Japanese assaults until the Japanese had essentially impaled themselves on a battle hardened British division.

In the center of the Army, the 20th Division commanded by MG Greyc fought and delayed to defend along the Shenam heights. The positions held by the

division, coupled with a understrength 15th Japanese Division, led to a virtual stalemate just east of Imphal. Due to the importance of Imphal and control of terrain to the east, Slim ordered the operational redeployment of the 5th Indian Division from the Arakan to Imphal. Slim counted on the 20th Division to hold off the main attack by the 15th Japanese Division, and believed that the threat of losing the Imphal plain, its airfield, and a line of communication to the British constituted the biggest threat to his army. With the 5th Division's forces arriving east of Imphal, Diampur was safe for the moment. The real threat came from an unexpected thrust from the north.

Slim began to realize that the forces in and around Kohima were no match for the Japanese 31st Division assaulting them, and he immediately ordered the XXXIII Corps headquarters (in India) and the 2nd Indian Division to conduct an operational movement from Arakan to Kohima by air to reinforce the front at Kohima. Slim was able to convince Lord Mountbatten that he needed additional aircraft for this purpose, and the redployment of these forces began immediately. (The movement had been anticipated by Slim, and movement plans had already been drawn up.⁴¹) The Japanese had expected a British division at Kohima, not the brigade that occupied the heights around the town and consequently did not take advantage of the positional and numerical superiority that they had over the British at Kohima.

Slim flew to Kohima and placed a young MG Ranking initially in charge of the battle in the northern zone until LTG Stopford and the XXXIII Corps arrived.

Slim gave Ranking three missions: defend Diampur, protect the railway at Diampur, and defend Kohima.⁴² Slim personally ensured that Ranking clearly understood his intent; Slim's intent was to hold Kohima at all costs and protect Diampur from capture.⁴³ Ranking assured Slim that he would hold the Japanese in Kohima. Slim left Kohima confident that his subordinate commander understood his intent, which Slim delivered personally to him. MG Ranking organized all the forces in the area around Kohima and Diampur. The subsequent successful defense of Kohima by a battalion detachment of the 4th Royals West was historic, and reinforced the old adage that men win wars, not machines. The successful defense occurred largely because the commander on the ground at Kohima, Ranking, clearly understood the intent of his higher commander. Slim's effort to ensure that Ranking understood the criticality of his mission in Kohima was one of the turning points in the Kohima/Imphal battle.

Slim, reading the battle with a great deal of accuracy, had earlier directed the XXXIII Corps headquarters and the 2nd Indian Division to deploy to Kohima/Diampur. The XXXIII Corps headquarters arrived in late March, and the subsequent arrival of the 2nd and 7th divisions ensured victory for Slim and his army.⁴⁴ Slim ordered portions of the army to begin conducting offensive operations as early as mid May to link up Imphal with Diampur. By the middle of May, the Japanese at Kohima were on the defensive, and Slim concluded that the battle for Imphal and Kohima was almost over. Slim's willingness to form and reform his plans in the heat of the campaign proved to be the margin of victory.⁴⁵

The Japanese commanders deserve some credit for their own defeat. Japanese commanders failed to adjust their plans in light of the situation. At Kohima, the 31st Japanese Division commander refused to deploy one of his brigades to support the weaker 15th Division around Imphal, in spite of orders to do so. The Japanese Fifteenth Army commander was thus unable to generate enough combat power at the decisive point just east of Imphal, and his main effort with the 15th Japanese Division failed. Mataguchi also failed to plan properly for logistical support; he had assumed that the 20 days of supplies carried by the Japanese divisions would be restocked after the capture of Imphal. Just as Slim had predicted, the Japanese attack into India had reached its culmination point. Slim's hammer soon struck the decisive blow to destroy the Japanese Army in Burma, just as his original plan almost nine months ago had envisioned. Slim's strength of will, operational flexibility, and operational concept had changed the course of the campaign.

In early June 1944, Slim pushed for the approval that he received on 3 June to begin final preparations for an offensive into Burma. Although he had directed his staff to begin planning in early May, this planning approval allowed him to focus his effort on the destruction of the Fifteenth Japanese Army.⁴⁶ Lord Mountbatten directed Slim to maintain and expand the airlift and ground lift to support China. Mountbatten declared this as the Fourteenth Army's first priority. Insofar as Slim's offensive was consistent with the support to China as a first priority, Mountbatten authorized Slim to press the offensive with current forces with "maximum effort."⁴⁷ Slim and Mountbatten agreed that the attack must be prosecuted even

during the monsoon season, something that had not been done in the past. The intent of this relentless attack was to press continually a haggard and defeated force, no matter the weather conditions. Although considerable discussion occurred about the utility of a sea invasion near Rangoon, the lack of priority for landing craft quickly ended that discussion. Slim's army was to strike the decisive blow against the Japanese army in Burma. Slim remained convinced that such an attack was the only course of action that would defeat the Japanese forces.⁴⁸ The operation, dubbed *Capital* by operational planners, was ordered executed in August 1944. Mountbatten directed Slim to "recapture all of Burma"⁴⁹ and Slim responded in splendid fashion.

The second and decisive phase of Slim's visionary plan of October 1943 was at hand. The Japanese forces had quietly withdrawn from the Assam region of India and had taken up defensive positions along the Irawaddy River near Mandalay. Slim's intelligence via air was relatively accurate. He had sent much of the Fourteenth Army to rest and recover in India. The XXXIII Corps, commanded by LTG Stopford maintained pressure on Japanese security detachments. From August until December, Stopford's corps trudged slowly eastward, fighting the monsoon-saturated terrain more than the Japanese. By mid-December, the crossings over the Chidwin River were secured. Slim, knighted on the 14th of December at Imphal (now nicknamed the Plain of Knights), began to concentrate forces for the coming battles in Burma.

Slim had only one focus in mid-December, and that was a single-mindedness to destroy the Japanese Army in Burma.⁵⁰ He continued to focus all of his attention to that end. He directed massive logistical efforts to ensure that his forces would not culminate before they reached Rangoon where resupplies were available. Slim knew that his logistical tail would actually be the limiting factor on how fast his army could attack. Slim was ready to attack; he was ready to "pay back the rest-with interest"⁵¹ by attacking to defeat the Japanese Army in Burma.

The movement of attacking forces started on 4 December, with the IV Corps attacking along the line Sittang--Inlebu-Ye-U--Mandalay. The IV Corps had the 7th and 19th divisions under its command. XXXIII Corps attacked along the western flank of the IV Corps. They moved through the line Kalewa--Monywa--Mandalay. Slim had his two corps converging on what he considered to be the decisive point on the battlefield. That decisive point was the Schwebo Plain, just north of Mandalay.⁵² Then Slim's reconnaissance aircraft, reporting on enemy dispositions and movements, caused him to rethink his operations. Slim decided to revise his operational concept to create a decisive advantage for his attacking army.

Slim received reconnaissance reports that the Japanese forces were concentrating on the south side of the Irawaddy River, around the city of Mandalay. His initial plan, given that the Japanese were northwest of both the Irawaddy River and Mandalay, concentrated British formations in this area to destroy the Japanese Army. Slim ordered the IV Corps to conduct a feint towards Mandalay with the 19th Division, which had already been identified by the Japanese. Simulated

electronic signatures representing the IV Corps reinforced the deception effort north of Mandalay.⁵³ This deception operation continued to draw the Japanese forces towards Mandalay. Slim simultaneously ordered the rest of the IV Corps to march secretly and swiftly around the XXXIII Corps, along the Myitha River Valley, and strike the lines of communications of the Japanese. The IV Corp's mission was to seize and hold the town of Meiktila, a major rail and road center through which all the Japanese supplies flowed. Slim planned to emplace the IV Corps in defensive positions in Meiktila, with this envelopment forcing the Japanese to attack back along their lines of communication. This IV Corps action forced the already weakened Japanese forces to attack against the defending Allied forces. Slim used a combination of strategic offensive and tactical defense to create a mechanism to defeat the Japanese as was his order from Mountbatten.

On the 19th of December, Slim ordered the execution of the revised plan.⁵⁴ Movements by the IV Corps took place throughout January, with only minor contacts with reconnaissance forces in the Myitha Valley. The XXXIII Corps and the deception operation by the 17th Division successfully fooled the Japanese. The Japanese even counterattacked towards a riverhead established by the 17th Division near Thabeikkyn. On 13 and 14 February, the 7th Indian Division, leading the IV Corps, secured bridgeheads over the Irawaddy near Nyaungu. The 20th Division, part of XXXIII Corps, attacked to seize bridgeheads at Myinmu. Securing river crossings set the stage for the final attack to Meiktila.

The 17th Division commanded by MG Cowan had the mission to attack to and seize Meiktila. He had two mobile brigades, two regiments of a tank brigade, armored cars, and a battery of self-propelled artillery pieces. By the 4th of March Cowan's division had moved 18 miles, occupied Meiktila, destroyed what limited rear area troops were in the garrison there, and prepared for the expected Japanese counterattack. Slim sent the 99th Airborne Brigade to support Cowan and to protect the vital airfield just east of the town.⁵⁵ The Japanese did conduct counterattacks, but they were so piecemeal they had little effect on the defending forces in Meiktila. Complete air superiority that had provided protection from detection now focused on the destruction of Japanese forces attacking towards Meiktila. By the end of March, Slim's army was firmly in control of the town. Although there were still some smaller battles to be fought east of Rangoon before the Japanese were ejected from Burma for good, the Japanese were defeated at the battle for Meiktila. Their lines of communications destroyed, their morale broken, their leadership doubtful of any victory, the Japanese fighting slowly came to a halt.

Slim's visionary plan of October 1943 had come to fruition, just as he had planned it almost eighteen months earlier.⁵⁶ He had the will to fight the campaign in his own way, and Slim defined the aim of the campaign as the destruction of the Japanese Army in Burma. Slim modified his campaign plan when necessary, and he exhibited flexibility, not obstinacy, in the face of a thinking enemy. He had trained and motivated his soldiers to fight an inspired campaign. Slim had indeed formed a victory from defeat.

IV-ANALYSIS

The purpose of this section is to examine the concepts in Field Manual 22-103 in the context of the Burma Campaign to determine the utility and completeness of these concepts today. The Burma campaign, designed and executed in a coalition environment, provides a framework that will occur in future contingency operations. Analysis of current doctrine is conducted with the following criteria: vision, purpose, direction, and motivation. The presence or absence of these criteria in the Burma Campaign can provide insight into the relevancy of current senior leadership doctrine. Additionally, concepts not currently in FM 22-103 will be addressed in this section, including whether these concepts should be part of future doctrinal updates.

Vision

Current U.S. Army doctrine prescribes vision as a critical leadership requirement for the operational commander. This vision is an establishment of the endstate of a campaign and the scheme of how to use resources and forces to reach those ends. General Slim, throughout his tenure in Burma and India, developed and maintained focus on his operational vision. Slim realized that he needed to do three things in order to defeat the Japanese.⁵⁷ First, he had to forge a trained army from the ravaged BURCORPS because the defeat that the BURCORPS received at the

hands of the Japanese Fifteenth Army left the BURCORPS defeated both physically and mentally. Second, Slim realized he needed adequate resources to pursue the Japanese and defeat them. Last, Slim had to design a campaign that would: first, ultimately end up in offensive action; second, remain simple in design; third, have a consistent theme and focus over time; and fourth, have an element of surprise in it.⁵⁸

Slim used these prerequisites to design the actual conduct of the campaign. He chose to let the Japanese Fifteenth Army attack into Eastern India. Slim envisioned that the Japanese would weaken themselves by attacking over extended and interdicted lines of communications, that they would culminate offensive operations around Imphal, and that the British could then conduct a major counterattack focused on the destruction of the Japanese 33rd Army.

Slim accurately assessed the operational situation, designed a campaign based upon his vision, and ensured that his entire command was focused on it throughout the campaign.⁵⁹ Slim's plan, approved by Mountbatten, centered around the defense of Imphal and drew the Japanese into the teeth of his defenses.⁶⁰ With the killing ground set, Slim envisioned a counterattack that would result in the destruction of the Japanese army in Burma.⁶¹ Slim had successfully ensured that his forces were trained for jungle warfare. Establishing training bases in India, Slim forced all units (his headquarters included) to conduct jungle training. This training included patrolling, soldier skills in a jungle environment, and tactical engagements.⁶² Training also occurred in limited small unit patrolling against Japanese

detachments. While having no operational value, these patrols proved to the Allies that they could operate successfully against the Japanese in the jungles of India and Burma.⁶³ Slim was confident that his army was trained and could defeat the Japanese even while in a secondary theater of operation. Slim planned on resourcing his army to win against the Japanese aggressors.⁶⁴

Purpose

Current U. S. senior leadership doctrine requires a clear purpose that the commander articulates. This is necessary for both junior and senior leaders because it gives them a reason for their potential sacrifices. As far back as the American Revolutionary War soldiers performed better in combat after understanding the reason that they were going to risk their lives.⁶⁵ Slim clearly provided a sense of purpose to his command, and that purpose dovetailed quite tightly with his operational vision for the Burma Campaign. Slim remained convinced that troops of all nationalities in the coalition would respond with enthusiasm if " they were kept informed of the reason for fighting, the justice of the cause, and the importance of beating the enemy."⁶⁶

Slim's purpose, very clearly and repeatedly emphasized in Defeat into Victory, was the defeat of the Japanese forces in Burma. Slim ensured that his subordinate corps commanders focused on the purpose in the defense in and around Imphal/Kohima, through the transition to offensive operations, and into the decisive attack into Burma. This sense of purpose permeated Slim's orders and discussions with everyone within his command and assisted in articulating his vision throughout

the combined command.⁶⁷ Slim was convinced that this purpose had to be "clear right through the force"⁶⁸ and that this understanding assisted in victory on the battlefield.

Direction

According to current doctrine, the direction provided to a unit by a senior leader must accomplish several tasks. This direction must maintain focus on the mission objective, build teams, focus on the future, and ensure training that is tough and focused on preparation for war.⁶⁹ This direction was an essential part of Slim's effort in Burma and played an integral part in the defeat of the Japanese in Burma.

Shortly after the withdrawal into India, Slim instituted a fierce training program to prepare his forces to defeat the Japanese in a jungle environment. Slim believed that he must first have trained and disciplined troops. Each division conducted small unit training, and they focused on patrols, encirclement techniques, and soldier skills. Centralized training at Ranchi included infantry battle schools, artillery centers, tank jungle training, water and river crossing operations, and integrated training between ground and air forces.⁷⁰ Interdivisional exercises capped a superb training period and Slim's forces had learned to live and fight as well if not better than the Japanese. His direction to train already hardened combat veterans in the techniques of jungle warfare ensured that Slim's army was prepared for combat.⁷¹

Slim's focus on the objective and his simultaneous focus on preparation for future operations provided his commanders with a sharply defined objective, and in the absence of orders from Slim they executed their missions within his vision and direction.⁷² MG Ranking, lacking any other guidance at Kohima, repeatedly dealt the Japanese tactical defeat after tactical defeat. Slim's focus on defeating the Japanese army was imbedded in Ranking's fighting posture at Kohima. Additionally, Slim spent as much time as he could visiting all his subordinate commanders, building a very cohesive team that understood each other. Slim stressed the importance of face to face meetings with subordinate commanders, almost always at the subordinate commanders' locations, to develop and maintain this sense of teamwork. Slim even went to visit the American General Stillwell at his headquarters to maintain that unity of effort throughout the campaign.⁷³ This sense of teamwork provided, along with the other issues discussed above, a sense of direction for the campaign of the Fourteenth Army. Slim was successful in this effort.

Motivation

The last key leadership attribute outlined in FM 22-103 is the requirement to motivate all members of the command. This motivation provides the impetus for the organization to fight willingly in the face of danger and death. Current doctrine on motivation includes the requirement to influence the action at the critical place and time, to reward soldiers, and to stress will and winning. Slim accomplished all of these in his campaign in Burma.

In an effort to build motivation in his troops, Slim developed a tough training program to prepare his soldiers for the coming fight. This training program enabled the troops, through mental and physical toughness, to impose their will on the enemy. Training camps established in India trained infantry, artillery, and other combined arms skills. This training included air-ground coordination, and the subsequent successful air attacks against the Japanese played a key role in the overall success of the campaign. Slim's sole effort prior to the Japanese attack into Imphal focused on developing a winning team of warriors. This he did exceedingly well.⁷⁴

During the conduct of the Burma campaign Slim did two things that further increased the motivation of his subordinates. First, he continually visited forward units. He provided leadership and a great moral boost by his sheer presence in the front lines. Visiting a Highland Regiment, Slim gave a quick speech to the troops. At the conclusion of the speech, one soldier reportedly jumped up and exclaimed, "Don't worry sir! We'll follow you anywhere."⁷⁵ Such was the moral boost created by one of hundreds of visits made by Slim to his units in the field. He took the time to talk to his corps commanders and reallocated resources to assist in fighting the battles based upon these on-the-scene observations and discussions. Amazingly, he did this without taking over the corps fights. On one occasion, Slim was writing an article for a British newspaper. When queried about how he could be writing an article during a battle, Slim responded that he had visited with all his units, that morale was high, and that he expected and trusted his corps commanders to call for help if they needed it.⁷⁶

Slim also created morale by taking on the challenges of making life for the troops better. He was very visible during all of his trips to forward units and they drew great strength by his presence. Emphasis centered on obtaining up-to-date rifles, providing sound medical care for soldiers, and plenty of ammunition to kill more Japanese.⁷⁷ Slim also streamlined the evacuation system and increased the number of ambulances available for evacuation. Soldier morale, when told that they would now be quickly evacuated when wounded or sick, soared to new heights.⁷⁸

Slim exuded confidence and it quickly spread among the men. He talked to them about their problems. He became involved in such issues as quality of food, mail, pay, leave and beer.⁷⁹ Slim's effort in these areas demonstrated to the troops that he was not afraid to visit the front lines, that he cared deeply about the quality of life even in the jungles of Burma, and that he had confidence in the soldiers and their leaders to perform and win. His personal visits paid great dividends and greatly enhanced the motivation of subordinate commanders and their troops.

There are several concepts present in the Burma campaign that have either not been addressed in FM 22-103 or have only superficial discussion. These are summarized in this monograph's Operational Leadership Model. (See Appendix D) This model provides a visual depiction of these additional concepts and is the basis for the remainder of the analysis in this section.

The most important issue for a senior commander to establish is a plan for a campaign. This campaign plan provides the basis for all operations in the theater of

war, includes the commander's operational vision, continues through the execution of the plan and focuses on achieving the strategic endstates prescribed by the political leadership of a nation. This campaign plan is far more than direction and purpose, as this plan describes the campaign from beginning to end and links means with ways to achieve strategic ends. Slim developed his campaign plan focusing on a tactical defense around Imphal/Kohima followed by a decisive attack to defeat the Japanese in Burma, in concert with the combined efforts to defeat the Japanese in Southeast Asia. Lord Mountbatten, Slim's higher headquarters commander, approved of Slim's campaign plan, and all subsequent efforts within the Fourteenth Army were focused on achieving the strategic endstates within the theater. Slim never lost sight of his focus, the defeat of the Japanese in Burma. His concentration of forces against the Japanese in Burma is a classic example of a campaign plan successfully executed.

The second concept that must be fully addressed in doctrine is morale of soldiers in war. While addressing motivation in FM 22-103, additional emphasis needs to be added to current doctrine. Campaigns are always fought by men, and man is the common denominator in any conflict. In spite of the vast array of technology that our forces currently have, it is men who run the machines. Consequently, the senior commander must never lose sight of the morale of his men and the effects that morale can have on the course of a campaign. Slim never lost sight of this fact and shortly after taking command of the Fourteenth Army he executed an

aggressive training program to improve the morale of his soldiers.⁸⁰ Slim remained convinced that the morale of his soldiers was his first priority:

There comes a moment in every battle against a stubborn enemy when the result hangs in the balance. Then the general, however skilful and far-sighted he may have been, must hand over to his soldiers, to the men in the ranks and to their regimental officers, and leave them to complete what he has begun. The issue rests with them, on their courage, their hardihood, their refusal to be beaten either by the cruel hazards of nature or by the fierce strength of their human enemy.⁸¹

Slim's ability to remember that men fight wars, in spite of his position as an army commander, is a lesson that is well worth remembering for all senior commanders. Future doctrine must continue to focus on man, not technology, as the common denominator, as the centerpiece for war.

The ability of a senior commander to develop a coalition and sustain it successfully in war is as necessary today as it was in World War II. While current leadership doctrine discusses teamwork and cohesion, there is no discussion of this cooperative effort in a combined environment. If recent events in Desert Storm are the norm, then most wars in the future will have a combined flavor to them. Slim effectively orchestrated the coalition that made up his army. This understanding of coalition of coalition cooperation contributed to the success of the campaign. At one point in the campaign, the American General Stillwell was ordered to operate under the command of General Giffard, the senior Army Group commander under Lord Mountbatten's command. There was no love lost between Giffard and Stillwell, and Stillwell refused to work for Giffard at all. Slim's positive image and

cooperative attitude with Stillwell in the past influenced Stillwell to respond with "I am prepared to come under General Slim's operational control until I get to Kam-
miang."⁸² Slim's ability to compromise in the past with Stillwell assisted in solving a very sticky command and control problem within the theater. He realized that unity of effort among coalition forces, and the ability to deal effectively with different personalities within the coalition leadership structure were key components to victory on the battlefield.⁸³ This ability to compromise and cooperate with coalition commanders was a hallmark of Slim, and is as necessary in future coalitions as it was in the Burma campaign.

The ability to provide a commander's intent and impose that intent on subordinates is a critical part of our doctrine today. What is not clearly articulated is the requirement to do this in a coalition environment, with different languages and cultures, and under different military terms, doctrines, and procedures. Slim overcame this difficulty by visiting with commanders at all levels, ensuring that his intent was clearly understood at all echelons. Our leadership doctrine must include this critical aspect of ensuring that commander's intent is understood in a coalition environment. As it is so important in today's U.S. Army doctrine, it must be equally stressed as a key to victory in a combined environment.

The concept of linkage, where political/strategic objectives are linked to operational objectives that are linked to tactical objectives, is worthy of a separate chapter in leadership doctrine. This linkage, achieved effectively by Slim and his Army in Burma, is a critical component in planning and executing a successful

campaign. Slim believed that the failure of his higher command to assign clear strategic objectives led to the initial defeat of the BURCORPS in Burma. In subsequent operations Slim believed that there was sufficiently clear objectives from higher commands to fight and win his campaign, and failure to do so would have led to disaster.⁸⁴ This linkage must include a continuous analysis of the meshing of ways and means to reach the operational ends. This understanding of linkage by the operational leadership of today and tomorrow is just as critical for victory today as it was for Slim, and needs to be included as part of our senior leadership doctrine lexicon.

The great mediators of war are, according to Clausewitzian theory, the notions of friction, the unknown, and luck. Each had its place in Slim's campaign and played a part in his victory in Burma. Friction, somewhat akin to walking in quicksand, is familiar to any military man. The plan gone awry, the unit lost in the dark, the ammunition that never arrived, the message to move sent but never received, all are examples of friction. Slim realized quickly that things left alone would go wrong very quickly, and they often did. He overcame this friction by being aggressive, visiting commanders and soldiers at critical points on the battlefield, and being flexible enough to change orders and plans if the situation warranted.⁸⁵ His plan for the defense of Kohima calculated that only a Japanese regiment would attack there. In reality one Japanese division attacked at Kohima. Slim remained flexible and, realizing that his plan was going awry, moved forces from elsewhere to deal with this

unexpected show of force at Kohima. Slim's reaction to the friction of war in Kohima was correct and turned a possible Japanese victory into a defeat.

Slim also understood that there was inherent unknowns on the battlefield, and he who came best prepared intellectually would be the victor.⁸⁶ Most importantly, there is an element of luck that is part of the nature of war. Slim was lucky that the Japanese Fifteenth Army did not strike initially to the west of Kohima and instead stuck dogmatically to objectives in the Kohima area. If the Japanese had struck for Dimapur and bypassed Kohima, they might have defeated the Fourteenth Army. Allied forces were not postured to protect Diampur, a critical supply center for both the Chinese and the British coalition in India. If Diampur were controlled by these attacking Japanese forces, both the British and the Chinese forces (under Stillwell) could have been logistically strangled. The Japanese, luckily for Slim and Stillwell, never adjusted their plan of attack to include Diampur. These three Clausewitzian concepts of friction, the unknown, and luck apply to the battlefields of tomorrow and should be concepts in our operational leadership doctrine.

The concept of war as an extension of policy is not in FM 22-103. This concept is central to understanding that the real limits of war are controlled by the policy makers. In the case of the Burma Campaign, Slim was not limited very much by senior Allied policy makers. He was essentially free to fight his campaign within the rules of war and with the resources that were provided to the Fourteenth Army. In more limited wars of the future, policy makers in the United States may impose stringent restrictions, as a result of political constraints, on the conduct of the

campaign. Operational commanders clearly must understand that the military as an element of power will always be controlled, to one degree or another, by its political masters.

The final concept that is not adequately addressed in FM 22-103 is the need to consider the will of the people in conducting any war. The will of the people, that desire of a nation's population to continue to fight a war, can either cause a war to continue or cause it to stop. Slim recognized this concept and wrote articles to keep the people informed and up-to-date about the war in an effort to keep the fighting will at home high.⁸⁷ He was interested in providing information to the people about his perspectives on the war, understanding how important it is to keep the fighting will of the people energized. In the Vietnam War, antiwar protesters and the Tet Offensive contributed to the erosion of the will of the American people to continue to support the war in Vietnam. The will of the American people had been worn down to the point that the war was over no matter what the military or political leadership wanted.⁸⁸ The lesson learned by Slim, forgotten in Vietnam, must be indelibly stamped into our future senior leadership doctrine.

Our current senior leadership doctrine contained in FM 22-103 provides us with some very useful concepts. The requirement of the operational leader to provide vision, purpose, direction and motivation to subordinates is significant, and Slim applied them in his conduct of the Burma campaign. The other operational concepts discussed here (campaign plan, strategic endstates, commander's will and intent in a coalition environment, morale and men, linkage, and friction/unknown

and luck, war as an extension of policy, and the will of the people) were present in Slim's Burma campaign and will be present in campaigns of the future, no matter what type of conflict arises. These additional concepts provide a more complete understanding of the way in which Slim conducted his Army operations and a more refined approach to current thoughts on operational leadership doctrine within the United States Army.

V-CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The United States armed forces face new challenges in force employment in the years to come. Whether these conflicts are vintage Cold War scenarios or the tribal conflict outlined by Martin Van Creveld in Transformation of War is yet unknown. The truth most likely lies somewhere in between these two poles, where contingency forces will be the normal force to be used in regional conflicts that threaten United States interests throughout the world. The challenges that face the operational commander in this new environment will test even the most flexible and experienced in the face of battle. These challenges will be largely overcome by superior leadership.

Current United States Army senior leadership doctrine, espoused in Field Manual 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels requires that operational commanders provide their organizations four essentials. First, the operational commander must provide a vision for the organization. Second, he must provide his organization with a purpose, communicating why the organization has been assigned a particular mission. Third, he must provide direction to subordinate organizations. Fourth, he must provide his subordinates with the motivation to fight and win on the battlefield. These essentials for the operational commander provide

senior leaders today with a doctrinal foundation from which to command their organizations.

The question is whether these essentials provide the key qualities and attributes that operational commanders need to design campaigns and link them effectively to strategic endstates. The examination of Slim's Burma campaign illustrates that current doctrinal emphasis on vision, purpose, direction, and motivation are adequate. Slim, commander of the Fourteenth Army in Burma during the Second World War, designed a very effective campaign to defeat the Japanese in spite of prior successes of the Japanese forces in Burma. Slim developed a vision for his army, focusing that vision on the defeat of the Japanese Army in Burma. He also provided a clear purpose and direction for his forces, and every effort and activity undertaken by his subordinate forces throughout the course of the campaign linked with Slim's purpose and direction. Perhaps Slim's greatest strength was his ability to motivate subordinates within his army. In these ways, Slim's activities lend credence to current United States Army senior leadership doctrine. Slim's efforts also provided insight into several other key issues worthy of incorporation into future United States Army senior leadership doctrine manuals.

There are several concepts or ideas that Slim used throughout his campaign to defeat the Japanese in Burma that are not adequately addressed in current doctrine (See Operational Leadership Model at Appendix D). First, it is necessary to develop a comprehensive section on developing an operational campaign plan that, while linked to both strategic and tactical efforts, continuously focuses on the

strategic endstate. This linkage, executed flawlessly by Slim in the Burma Campaign, is an essential element of victory. Second, doctrine must include a discussion of the commander's intent, as that intent is a key concept in our warfighting doctrine. Further, this discussion must include the requirement for the operational commander to convey that intent to subordinates in a coalition, who may not understand such concepts. Third, doctrine must focus on the will of the operational commander as a key to success. Fourth, doctrine must include a discussion of men and their morale and how poor morale can defeat an army in spite of the best campaign plan. Slim's first priority was to improve the morale of his soldiers, as he saw this as the first essential step in rebuilding the Fourteenth Army.⁸⁹

There are two additional concepts that must be added to senior leadership doctrine to make it more complete. First, doctrine must include a discussion on the political and social effects of war. The political aims, and how they affect war must be clearly understood by operational commanders. As the military is an instrument of a democratic government, this understanding is even more essential. Lastly, doctrine must include the concept of the will of the people, how it can be affected by today's media, and how to take that into account when campaigns are planned. For without the support of the people of a nation, the efforts in a campaign can be defeated on the homefront.

The key attributes and skills prescribed in current senior leadership doctrine of the United States Army are the leadership tools of the operational commander. The concepts recommended in this monograph provide the operational

commander with a more complete doctrinal foundation in preparation for assuming duties as an operational commander. We must never forget that men fight wars, but operational commanders can, by the very nature of their campaign plan, ensure victory just as General Slim did in the Burma Campaign. As the United States Army focuses on an uncertain future, this sound operational leadership doctrine will be the guide wire that leads forces into conflict, no matter where or what type of conflict that may be.


APPENDIX A-IMPHAL/KOHIIMA^{UN}
4 Corps dispositions on 29th. Feb: 1944
and Japanese plan of attack

4 Corps dispositions on 29th. Feb: 1944
and Japanese plan of attack




APPENDIX B-ATTACK INTO BURMA⁹¹

CAPITAL and EXTENDED CAPITAL




**APPENDIX C-FIELD MANUAL 22-103 LEADERSHIP
MODEL⁹²**



APPENDIX D- OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP MODEL

Operational Leadership Model



END NOTES

¹ Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith, (Oxford University Press, New York, 1971): 66.

² Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1984), 100-101.

³ U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5 Operations, Preliminary Draft, Department of the Army, Washington D.C., 21 August 1992: 2-14.

⁴ IBID: 2-16.

⁵ William Slim, Defeat into Victory, (PaperMac, MacMillan Publishers LTD, London, England, 1987). This is the title of Slim's intriguing book about his exploits in the Burma Campaign. Slim used the title to convey the fact that the Fourteenth Army had achieved a remarkable victory in Burma after first receiving a sound defeat at the hands of the Japanese 15th Army.

⁶ U.S. Army, Field Manual 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels, Washington D. C., June 1987: 3.

⁷ Field Manual 22-103: 5.

⁸ IBID: 80.

⁹ IBID: 80.

¹⁰ IBID: 80.

¹¹ IBID: 16.

¹² IBID: 13.

¹³ IBID: 14.

¹⁴ IBID: 14.

¹⁵ IBID: 14.

¹⁶ IBID: 14.

¹⁷Trevor N. Dupuy, Military History of World War II, Volume 8, Asian Land Battles: Expansion of Japan in Asia, (Franklin Watts, New York, N.Y, 1973): 31.

¹⁸IBID: 33, 39.

¹⁹IBID: 41.

²⁰IBID: 46.

²¹IBID: 50.

²²IBID: 56.

²³Ronald Levin, Slim : The Standard Bearer, (Leo Cooper LTC, Octopus Publishing Group, London England, 1971): 132.

²⁴After Action Report (AAR) of the Fourteenth Army, 10 September 1945:
1. General Slim, among all of his tasks as the new commander of the IVth Army, envisioned a primary task to change the attitudes and moral of the men under his command. He had to make good troops feel and believe in themselves again. In his after action report he repeatedly stressed that this leadership aspect had as much to do with victory as the jungle training, logistical effort, and air superiority that followed had.

²⁵Levin: 135.

²⁶Slim, Defeat into Victory: 296.

¹⁶After Action Report (AAR) of the Fourteenth Army, 10 September 1945:
2. In Slim's AAR, he was convinced that the Japanese, whose forces had doubled during the monsoon period, were preparing to attack into eastern India. The Japanese intentions were in concert with his efforts in Assam.

²⁸Levin: 143.

²⁹After Action Report (AAR) of the Fourteenth Army, 10 September 1945

³⁰Levin: 157

³¹AAR Fourteenth Army: 3.

³²AAR Fourteenth Army: 1.

³³AAR Fourteenth Army: 5.

³⁴ AAR Fourteenth Army: 5.

³⁵ AAR Fourteenth Army: 6.

³⁶ Levin: 89.

³⁷ AAR Fourteenth Army: 4.

³⁸ Levin: 171.

³⁹ AAR Fourteenth Army: 6.

⁴⁰ Levin: 172.

⁴¹ AAR Fourteenth Army: 6.

⁴² Levin: 177.

⁴³ Levin: 177.

⁴⁴ AAR Fourteenth Army: 8. Slim remained convinced that the attacks by these two divisions against Japanese forces in and around Kohima completed the defeat of the Japanese at Kohima. Slim realized that the fighting was difficult, but in his written after action report almost felt like his forces had achieved moral ascendancy over the enemy.

⁴⁵ Levin: 184.

⁴⁶ Levin: 190.

⁴⁷ Levin: 191.

⁴⁸ Levin: 192.

⁴⁹ Levin: 197.

⁵⁰ William Slim, :Campaign of the Fourteenth Army 1944-45. Australian Army Journal. August 1950: 8.

⁵¹ Levin: 202.

⁵² AAR Fourteenth Army: 9.

⁵³ Levin: 214.

⁵⁴ AAR Fourteenth Army: 14.

⁵⁵ Levin: 225.

⁵⁶ Louis Allen, Burma, The Longest War 1941-45. London England: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1984: 188.

⁵⁷ Webb-Carter, EJ. "Burma 1943-45 What Lessons for the Future?" This is an undated article provided to this author from COL P.J. Durrant, British Liaison Officer to the Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The article was sent from the archives at the British Staff College in Camberly, England.

⁵⁸ Webb-Carter: 15.

⁵⁹ Webb-Carter: 19.

⁶⁰ Levin: 155.

⁶¹ Levin: 156.

⁶² Slim, Defeat into Victory: 142.

⁶³ IBID: 144.

⁶⁴ Webb-Carter: 32.

⁶⁵ FM 22-103: 12. This is an observation made by Baron Von Steuben, a Prussian officer training American soldiers. The need to know why one is fighting is a critical for the young soldier today as it was over 200 years ago.

⁶⁶ Evans, Slim: 114.

⁶⁷ Webb-Carter: 19.

⁶⁸ Slim. Defeat into Victory: 542.

⁶⁹ Field Manual 22-103: 80.

⁷⁰ Slim, Defeat into Victory: 146.

⁷¹ IBID: 538.

⁷² IBID: 535-536.

⁷³ Stillwell did not get along with most British officers but felt part of the team when he was periodically under the operational control of Slim and the Fourteenth Army.

⁷⁴ Slim, Defeat into Victory: 541-542.

⁷⁵ Evans, Slim: 115.

⁷⁶ Webb-Carter: 22.

⁷⁷ Evans, Slim: 114.

⁷⁸ IBID: 113.

⁷⁹ Webb-Carter: 34.

⁸⁰ Slim, Defeat into Victory: 538.

⁸¹ IBID: 551.

⁸² IBID: 207.

⁸³ IBID: 536.

⁸⁴ IBID: 536.

⁸⁵ IBID: 537-538. Although Slim did not use these terms, the context of his comments in Defeat into Victory support their use here.

⁸⁶ IBID: 535.

⁸⁷ Weber-Carter: 22.

⁸⁸ Krepinevich, Andrew F. The Army in Vietnam. (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987): 250.

⁸⁹ IBID: 127.

⁹⁰ Evans, Slim: 120.

⁹¹ IBID: 184.

⁹² FM 22-103: 5.

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